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The present can seldom be understood without reference to
the past; in some instances the recent past, in others a more distant
past. The task of the policy maker remains, however, that of
distinguishing those current events which bear similarity to earlier
activity and those that are quite without precedent. It is not an easy
choice.
The 13th Century is one of those few in history that was
both an interlude and a vigorous, active turning point. It followed on the
conclusion of the Dark Ages, but preceded the Renaissance. It was the
century of the Crusades, when European rulers sought to extend the
geographic domain of Christendom but failed and, in doing so, brought
about the demise of feudalism. It was a Period which coincidentally
encouraged the flowering of chivalry and introduced barbaric torture as an
instrument of legal process - the inquisition. Such monuments as Magna
Carta, the Cologne Cathedral, the papacy, the great universities, the








during the 1200s. Kublai Khan became Governor of China; Dante, St.
Francis of Assisi and St. Thomas Aquinas illuminated the era.
Religious inspiration was a mighty force. So was religious intolerance.
It distorted attitudes toward Islam even as Christian Europeans
benefitted in their daily lives from the much superior Moslem science
and technology.
Turbulence, confusion and change marked the 13th Century;
barbarity was present, as was the promise of civilization. In the midst
of the period, Alfonso the Great observed wryly "Had I been present at
the creation, I would have given some useful hints for the better
ordering of the universe."
Seven hundred and fifty years following the death of
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Gegghis Khan, the 20th Century offers, if anything, even greater evidence
of turbulence, confusion and change. Extraordinary scientific discoveries
occur simultaneously with savage human conduct. Unprecedented military
activity has proved in some instances to be wise and productive, in
others to be ill-chosen and destructive of the democratic process it
often seeks to defend. Economic imbalance poses challenges of immense
proportion. Opportunity and entrapment are often disguised. The
confusion thus created contributes sometimes to adventurism, sometimes
to the fatalistic assumption that the human chronicle is an unalterable
continuum.
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The 13th Century should serve as a reminder to us that at
some periods, circumstance combines both intense peril and the
ingredients for extraordinary accomplishment. We live in such a time.
In one fundamental respect, the 20th Century breaks from
the past even more distinctly than did the 13th. Mankind faces now the
realization that in several major sectors its condition is terminal,
that errors committed now may be irreversible. Never before has peril
been so irremedial.
- The biosphere on which we all depend for our life-
support systems is not able, indefinitely, to maintain a natural
equilibrium countering the continued release into the oceans and atmosphere
of immense quantities of poisonous effluents.
- The explosive force of modern nuclear weaponry is so
destructive, and the consequences of its use so permanent and far-reaching,
that any consideration of its application must include, perforce, the
contemplation of global holocaust.
- The natural supply of non-renewable resources on which
our industrial complexes depend in order to function may in certain
instances be approaching exhaustion.
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In some circumstances these sectors interlink and
contribute in compound fashion to the peril. One example is found in
the quantities of oil now released into the oceans either purposely
or negligently: more than one million tons of this non-renewable and
precious resource each year poison the wholesomeness of our seas and
beaches. (If off-shore blow-outs of the kind now raging in the Gulf of
Mexico become more commonplace, this figure will quickly balloon.)
Twentieth-century policy-makers must not lose sight of
these absolutes in their quest for solution of the problems before them.
It is a novel circumstance that such constraints limit the exercise of
power of all states; they are constraints that are indifferent to size,
indifferent to might. In the result there is now in progress a degree
of levelling unprecedented in earlier times.
No longer can the very powerful be confident of their
military, economic or political invulnerability. The interrelationship of
issues which were once capable of exclusive management, and the present
economic interdependence of nations both large and small, permit nations
of a variety of sizes to act with influence and effect. That fact has
introduced into the international community an unpredictable element.
No longer do we live in the age of the major, middle and lesser power.
Ours is the age of the "effective" power. In it, responsibility for the




Events and conditions cascade upon us. Canadians find
themselves today in a world far different from that of even 20 years
ago. Then, the United Nations consisted of 83 member states. Today,
the number is 149. With the important exceptions of Zimbabwe and
_
Namibia, the colonial era has virtually concluded. In one of the most
extraordinary periods in the history of the world, hundreds of millions
of persons have passed from a colonial status to one of political
self-rule. The transition in some instances has been the forerunner
of political stability. Often it has not. And seldom has independence
brought with it the economic buoyancy required to satisfy rising
expectations of social well-being.
In that same period of 20 years the spectre of communism,
and in some instances the reality of communist aggression, solidified
the previous division of the world into political blocs - Warsaw Pact
and NATO. Those adhering to neither bloc, though in some instances
intimately connected with one or the other, in most instances called
themselves the non-aligned. From a charter membership of 25 in 1961,
that group has expanded to its present strength of 89. It is meeting at
this minute in Havana.
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Contemporaneous with this sequence of political
revolution and evolution has been another revolution, one which in terms
of impact is perhaps of greater scope than any since 1300. This
revolution is scientific and technological in nature. It has made
obsolete previous concepts of transportation and communication; it has
influenced in overwhelming fashion the design and disposition of weapons
systems; it has made possible undreamed of increases in agricultural
productivity; it has contributed to the reorganization of human endeavour
with solid state electronic components and micro-processing techniques.
It has done little, however, to remedy the imbalance between rich and
poor nations.
The combination of these influences and events has created
the world of 1979 - a world of unprecedented expectations, of explosive
increases in population, of political competition and economic disparity,
of ecological deterioration and military threat. In time-frames now
measured in micro-seconds, situations demand rapid analysis and response.
We can only envy the luxury of contemplation which accrues to historians
as an element of their profession, permitting them long after the event
to determine what was cause and what was effect. Those of us coping with
the kaleidoscopic flood of human experience which is the present have no
time to sort one from the other; we must take decisions now, and must
do so often on the basis of inadequate evidence, conditioned always by past
influences. Is the Soviet presence in Southern Africa the cause of racial
agitation there, or has the failure to eliminate minority regimes caused
the majority to turn to communist support? Has better nutrition and
increased health care launched an irreversible increase in population,
or will birth rates begin to drop dramatically as parents gain in confidence
that their children will survive into adulthood? Historians in due
course will tell us which is the answer in each case. In the meantime,
governments must act on the assumption they know the correct response.
Technology has produced no substitute for reasoned judge-
ment. What it does provide, and often in prodigious quantities, is
information. It is this that must be organized, analyzed, assessed,
employed. One collector system is dependent upon earth-orbiting satellites.
In the period that we will be gathered here this morning, such a satellite
could have made three passes over Kingston. What is the imagery that it
and the many others are assembling?
III
One task assigned to satellites is the monitoring of the
nuclear forces of each of the United States and the Soviet Union, a vital
element in the relationship between the two states. Each of these
countries in 1979 continues to play a dominant role as a global military
actor. Each is possessed of an arsenal of strategic weaponry but neither
is confident it possesses a scenario for its effective employment. (The
terminology of strategy reflects the innovations in technology. Second
strike capability has given way to counterforce proposals which in turn
have been blurred by the vision of MAD - mutual assured destruction.)
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Cautiously, with agonizing slowness, the two powers have
agreed to deny to themselves certain spatial, sectoral and quantitative
options. SALT I has proceeded to SALT II. The Outer Space Treaty,
the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the
Seabed Treaty, the Environment Protocol are all in place. Management of
the armament relationship occupies much time and energy in each of the
two countries. The key ingredient of trust remains elusive, however,
sometimes in the negotiating forum as at SALT, CCD or MBFR, sometimes
in the domestic arena as now, in the United States Senate.
Each of these nuclear giants is well aware of the awesome
destructive capacity of nuclear weapons. Each is cognizant of the danger
of accidental war (they have implemented bilateral undertakings to
reduce the risk), and each is aware of the uncertainty surrounding any
scenario of nuclear weapons application. No theatre commander in the
history of warfare has ever come under attack by nuclear weapons; no
prediction of the scale and effect of response and counter-response can
be accepted unquestionably. In the result the superpower nuclear balance
is a matter of continuing study, discussion, management. It promises
some degree of stability. Not so the issue of proliferation.
The latter threat stems from the unpredictability associated
with the Nth state and its lack of experience with nuclear options. And
here the only international instrument in place - the Non-Proliferation
Treaty - is regarded with suspicion and disdain by many proud nations
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because of the establishment within it of discriminatory principles. As
technological competence increases, the attitudes and policies of some
of the non-adherents to the NPT become increasingly important. The
current tension and nuclear-intention
uncertainty in each of India and
Pakistan are examples of the problem; that tension in turn is enhanced
by the common border each country shares with the Peoples Republic of
China, itself possessed of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and still feeling
its way onto an unfamiliar world stage.
Among many of the developing countries there exists a
strong belief that the industrialized states will endeavour to maintain
their economic superiority through the systematic and selective denial
of essential technology. One of the most vital elements in the
industrialization process is energy, and one of the increasingly attractive
sources of non-conventional energy is the nuclear mode. The mere suggestion,
therefore, of stringent safeguards or other precautions against the
diversion of the nuclear process into weaponry arouses protests and
accusations that dependency is the motivating factor. And so long as
nuclear arms control and disarmament is the sluggish and circuitous
exercise that it has become once again, then will there continue to be
presented the inelegant but provocative analogy of 'vertical' and
'horizontal' proliferation.
Much is demanded of the exercises now underway at the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the London Nuclear Suppliers Club,
and the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. Much work is
needed as well to demonstrate to acquisitive states the inherently
destabilizing effect of primitive nuclear devices and their consequent
failure as a deterrent.
In short, the world cannot assume, without the dedication
of increased resources on a number of fronts, that the nuclear weapons
hazard will diminish. Indeed, one of the unanticipated and certainly
undesirable consequences of SALT II may be an increase in nuclear
weapons acquisition. The lesson will not be lost on the Nth states.
IV
Susceptible as well to satellite imagery, but far less
disciplined than are the preparations for a nuclear test, are the
instances of use of conventional weapons. These are many and are
globally hazardous whether the exchanges are within borders or across
them. This is so because the communicability of conflict, and the
constraints to its containment, make civil war as dangerous a threat to
world stability as is international hostility. One of the vectors of
its transmission is the rationale of the liberation movement, which
makes ever more diffuse the distinction between internal and international.
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In this summer of 1979 conflict rages across boundaries
in the Middle East, in Southern Africa and in Indo-China. Armed
struggles flicker and flare in Iran, in Ethiopia, in Chad, in Afghanistan,
in Ulster, in the Spanish Sahara and, until recent days, in Nicaragua.
The ingredients for revolt exist wherever temptation and complaint
intersect. There is no reason to expect that the incidence of inter-
section will decrease in the future.
The ability of the international community to bring to
bear some measure of standard analysis and some sense of the balance
between justice and orderliness will determine the rate of infectiousness
as well as the rate of success in resolving the issues underlying these
conflicts. Not all actors, of course, measure either justice or
orderliness in comparable fashion. Not all rate equally highly the value
of a political environment free from military tension. Not all accept
the tenets of community in a regional, let alone a planetary, sense.
This fact makes more difficult the design of any Canadian response to
conflict elsewhere.
Canada is some distance geographically from each of these
hot spots yet our history teaches us that remoteness is no barrier to
involvement. More than 50 years have passed since Senator Dandurand
informed the Assembly of the League of Nations that Canadians "live in a
fire-proof house, far from inflammatory materials." Yet on numerous
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occasions, for various reasons, Canadian governments have found it to
be in the national interest to become involved in seemingly far away
turbulence. In recent years this involvement has most often taken the
form of some collective activity under the aegis of the United Nations
or of NATO. Yet because of their good fortune to be residents of
a country which shares a boundary with only a single state, and that the
most stable of democracies, Canadians continue to regard with complacency
their tranquil neighborhood in a turbulent world. Not in Canada was
much concern expressed at the possible spread of fuel shortages in
either 1973 or 1979. Not here is there much sense of the vulnerability
of our national fabric to political, economic or social events elsewhere.
The indifference contributes to the peril.
A good number of the conflicts are modern reflections
of long-enduring complaints. Some, like the regional tensions in Iran,
or the religious animosities in Ulster, are centuries old; some in Africa
and Asia rest on tribal and ethnic origins; others as in Afghanistan or in
the Middle East are rooted in much more recent political activity.
Still another cockpit of conflict threatens world stability.
As the colonial powers withdraw from the tiniest and economically least
viable of their former empires, the phenomenon of the micro-state has
emerged, and with it a new quality of vulnerability. In the Caribbean,
in the South Pacific and in the Indian Ocean there exist tiny island
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communities in varying stages of political independence, few of them
capable of repelling an onslaught by even a dozen or two well armed and
determined attackers. The possibility of occurence of such a phenomenon
passed from the theoretical to the actual a few months ago in Grenada.
The source of such attack could be internal or external; the chances
of repelling one under present circumstances varies from unlikely to
impossible. Equally unattractive is the prospect of adequately
preparing the governmental authorities to permit them to withstand
incidents of this nature. To do so would be to change to their detriment
the informal social structures now existing. Perhaps the only effective
deterrent would be, as in the past, the existence of superior external
forces available for transport to the scene. In the post-colonial world,
these could only be of an international character. In the age of non-
intervention, the creation of a rationale for the employment of such a
force is an intimidating prospect. The need for some solution to the problem
is now being examined urgently by some of the states which are potential
victims.
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Conflict springs forth from a variety of courses, most of
them indiscernible to satellite surveillance. National or ethnic pride,
religious militancy, and minority mistreatment have all repeated themselves
as factors, but the single most frequent element in disputes is economic
in nature. It was economic motivation that led to all of the colonial
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wars, to the assaults on each of China and Japan in the 19th Century,
and to the lengthy trade wars between the maritime powers of Western
Europe. Economic factors contributed as well primarily and directly to
World War II, in the view of Sir Winston Churchill.
In 1979, economic issues dominate the international scene.
Their potential as the cause of conflict cannot be disregarded. Of more
immediate importance, the continuance of these issues contributes to
the discontent and malaise now so prevalent in the world.
Succeeding sessions of the Economic Summit have addressed
a range of issues economic in nature; a series of economic conferences
has focussed on one or another sector - the Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(just concluded in Geneva following several years of intensive sessions),
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (the 5th session
of which took place in Manila last year), the Conference on International
Economic Cooperation (in Paris in 1977). A heavy proportion of these
discussions concentrates on the north-south dimension of economic
activity. They do so because more and more there is acknowledgement that
the world's economy is not working well for anyone, and that it will not
improve for anyone unless it improves for all. For this to happen, a




Several means to this end are now being pursued; some
have exhibited more success than have others. If one sets aside for a
moment the more classical forms of development assistance, a technique
to bolster economic performance now attracting increasing attention
is that of common market creation. Such entities assume several forms.
The Caribbean countries chose to create first a free-trade area
(CARIFTA) which later matured into a common market (CARICOM). Twenty-
four Latin American and Caribbean countries have been experimenting
with something called SELA, an economic system embodying certain common
elements. The Andean Pact, of Bolivia, Colombia, Equador, Peru and
Venezuela has launched a number of studies and projects which draw upon
and seek to benefit factors present in each of the member countries.
The French-speaking countries in West Africa belong to a monetary union
and rely upon a single unit of currency. They, with others, have formed
the Economic Community of West African States. The very ambitious
Association of South East Asian Nations has a firm economic as well as
political base. So does the Council of Arab Economic Unity. Some geographic
groupings have negotiated special arrangements with the European Community,
of which the Lomé Convention is the pioneer and best known. Movements of
economic union among developing countries ere afoot elsewhere. Not
deterred by the difficulties or the spectacular failures such as the
East African Community, these efforts persist. One now being given active
consideration is in the South Pacific, extending from Samoa to New




Each of these initiatives is designed in one way or another
to overcome the problems associated with smallness and to gain the benefits
of market units of greater scale. It is a problem familiar to
successive generations of Canadians.
Canada is the only major industrialized country (as measured
by membership in the Economic Summit) which does not have access for its
goods to a protected market of more than 100 million persons. (Japan
and the United States both enjoy domestic markets larger than that figure;
Britain, France, Germany and Italy are all members of the European
Community with a total population of 259 million.)
Largely as a result of scale, Canadian dependence upon
international trade is striking. 24.5% of the Gross National Product is
derived from the sale abroad of Canadian goods and services. The
comparable United States figure is 10%. Fully one half of all Canadian
manufacturing jobs are dependent upon exports. The U.S. figure - 1/6th.
And no less than 55% of all our agricultural acreage is dedicated to
foreign markets as compared to 33-1/3% in the United States.
The Canadian economy is inextricably part of an international
system, and is dependent for its health upon the well-being of that system.
An ever-growing part of that system is the group of developing countries.
Examples abound according to World Bank statistics: 43% of all Japanese
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merchandise exports are sold in the developing countries. 37% of U.S.
merchandise exports go to the same markets. LDC imports of merchandise
from the industrialized countries in the 1970s has grown at a pace
more than 50% faster than merchandise trade among the industrialized
countries. And in 1976 the industrialized countries enjoyed a
favourable balance of trade with the LDCs of some $70 billion.
It appears self-evident, therefore, that economic opportunity
for the industrialized countries rests in large measure with growth in
the LDCs. President Carter stated recently: "Only by acting together
(with the developing countries) can we expand trade and investment in
order to create more jobs, to curb inflation, and to raise the standard
of living of our peoples.
"The industrial nations ... cannot by themselves bring
about world economic recovery. Strong growth and expansion in the
developing countries are essential ...
"For the rest of this century, the greatest potential for
growth is in the developing world."
Growth in the developing countries means in large measure
healthy, well-fed, educated people. Yet in country after country the
opposite is more often the norm. Almost one half of the 2 billion persons
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in those countries exist on annual incomes of U.S.$300. or less.
Developing country governments are acutely aware of the conditions of
their own people and of the disparity in living standards between them
and the residents of the industrialized states. That awareness is
contributing to a tension in the world climate which portends
considerable difficulty in the future. Former German Chancellor
Willy Brandt said in New York last winter that relations between the
industrialized and the developing countries "constitutes the most
important social problem for the rest of the century."
Robert McNamara wrote last spring: "... unless there is
visible progress towards a solution (of LOC poverty) we shall not have
a peaceful world. We cannot build a secure world upon a foundation
of human misery."
VI
In what order of priority does one place these issues of
nuclear proliferation, of outbreaks of belligerency, of crises both
economic and political? How do democratically-elected
governments find
time to assign priorities when assailed from all sides by questions of
urgency? Sir Winston Churchill once offered a superb non response to
such a question. "History", he said, "is just one damn thing after another."
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Energy and environment are two such. Each has roots.
The unprecedented industrial growth of the 50s and 60s was partly a
product of the availability of low-cost oil; this, in turn, permitted
and demanded some progress in combatting environmental pollution.
Then came both oil embargoes and huge price increases. These led quickly
to a peculiar combination of economic recession and faltering recovery,
of inflation, unemployment, still higher oil prices, shifts in other
commodity prices, balance of payments disequilibrium, and exchange rate
fluctuations. Environmental concerns decreased and policy conflicts
began to emerge between growth and conservation. They continue
unabated today and all too often leave the observer with the impression
that growth and conservation are mutually exclusive alternatives. That
is not the case.
In Canada, in the period to 1990, a reduction in the annual
rate of growth of energy consumption from 4% (as now projected) to 2%
would save, it has been calculated, a volume of energy equivalent
tO the output of six Syncrude plants, plus 80% of the expected annual
Canadian output of the Mackenzie Valley pipeline, plus fifteen Pickering-
size nuclear plants, plus 10 million tons of bituminous coal. Waste and
growth are not synonomous, even though they often appear indistinguishable
in statistical tables; conservation and growth can be mutually supportive.
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Energy is a multi-faceted piece in the economic matrix.
Historically, its supply side has attracted considerably more
attention than has pricing. By the time of the 21st Century, however,
with the likely serious depletion of fossil fuel reserves, supply will
again be the key component unless alternative sources are established.
Today, however, price is the compelling element.
Price increases have stimulated inflation and recession
in the industrialized countries. In the developing countries, many of
which are totally dependent upon oil imports as a source of comercial
energy and ofail-derived products such as fertilizer, price rises have
dealt a crippling blow. In many places strains are evident in the social
and political structures. In the United States, violent conduct in
gasoline lines. In Canada, different but possibly more profound events.
The current spread between the domestic crude price at
Toronto - $15.25 per barrel - and the imported price at Montreal - $25.00 -
has created turbulent forces now gathering strength. Symptomatic of
them are the tensions resulting from the immense and rapid inter-
provincial transfers of real resources. The impact of this phenomenon
upon the Canadian federal structure has yet to be revealed to Canadians
in all of its dimensions.
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References to energy appear again and again in this or
any other canvas of the world scene - as an aspect of environmental
degradation, as a factor in the nuclear proliferation puzzle, as an
element in international economics, as a fibre in the social fabric.
Energy issues, clearly, are not severable. Nor, I suggest, are they
susceptible of solution within Canada or without absent equitable and
representative legal regimes. In this respect they are no different
from the other subjects I have mentioned this morning.
But the regimes are painfully slow in their evolution.
Notwithstanding adequate evidence that the world is not functioning well,
notwithstanding persuasive arguments that new cooperative mechanisms
are needed, even such obvious instances as a comprehensive law of the sea
remains incomplete. As one result, Canadian law enforcement agents are
now arresting off the Pacific coast fishing boats of United States
registry as they arrested four years ago off the Atlantic coast fishing
vessels of Soviet registry.
The international community last month once again found it
not possible to conclude negotiations aimed at a global maritime regime.
Some further progress was made but there is still danger of foundering.
This, even though states, both coastal and land-locked, now agree that
the sea encompasses resources and activities which have economic,
environmental, political and military implications. They agree as well
... 23
- 23 -
in principle that the sea must no longer be viewed as a limitless
resource, self-renewing and incapable of exhaustion, open to those with
the power to employ it but denied in certain instances to others
because of, as one example, their lack of littoral qualifications.
And as the states agree, so have they come to recognize
and accept that a state's interests in the waters off its coasts are
not always territorially co-extensive and do not therefore require
protection of a uniform nature. Territorial limits have for some years
been distinct in breadth from fisheries zones. Different protective
techniques are employed for different fish stocks with some species,
such as salmon, demanding peculiar arrangements. Particular waters,
because of traffic or climatic or physical hazards, require particular
regulatory mechanisms.
Gradually gathering way is an awareness of the global role
of the oceans and of their critical contribution as an element in the
planetary biosphere. Military and transportation applications notwith-
standing, the absolute requirements of the human race for a functioning
physical environment and for equitable and efficient exploitation of
resources both living and non-living in the oceans and ocean floor, are
now dictating the priorities of policy formulation and application. The
reasoning of Grotius and Vattel is in large measure no longer applicable:
their assertion that the sea cannot be reduced to possession because of
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its liquid nature and its indefinable limits has been invalidated by
scientists who have devised techniques of planting permanent detection
and destructive devices in the seabed; their contention that the
resources of the sea are so inexhaustible that no injury can be done
to them either through navigation or fishing now echoes hollowly as
some fish species have been eliminated through greed, and as large
tracts of ocean have been fouled beyond recovery through irresponsible
acts of the masters and owners of large vessels.
Yet as modern technology has overtaken the understanding
of these jurisprudential giants, their devotion to the concept of an
international community and to a body of law to regulate the conduct
of its members is of greater importance today than it was in their
lifetimes. The nature of that community has changed perceptibly and
the number of its members has increased immensely, but the need for
cooperation and orderly conduct has never been greater. In 1979 the
possessory theories of Bynkershoek are as outmoded as the 17th century
cannon whose range gave rise to the original breadth of the territorial
sea. Equally outmoded are some of the other concepts that still play




Any snapshot of the world scene, and certainly the one
we are sharing this morning, becomes quickly dated. Whether or not
affected by preceding events, the image quickly loses focus under the
influence of a relentless future. Circumstances change with a bewildering
rapidity. One such circumstance is the momentum of urban growth.
At this time, in the developing world, in excess of
650 million people live in cities and towns. 8y the end of the century,
that figure will be 1 billion, 600 million. The impact will be greatest
in the very largest of the cities. By the year 2000, some 40 cities are
projected to exceed 5 million people in size; 18 of those may be larger
than 10 million each. One of them, Mexico City, may reach 30 million.
A single city with a population greater than all of Canada. All present
concepts of 'community' disappear beneath the onslaught of such a
concentrated mass of human beings. What of shelter, of water supply and
sanitary waste disposal, of transportation? What of human dignity in
such circumstances?
These changes will occur notwithstanding that population
growth likely peaked in the world in the early 1970s. They represent
a growth in the labour force in those countries of some half billion persons
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and a pressure upon urban sites and services of horrendous proportions.
The potential for economic and political discord is overwhelming.
All of our planning and all of our understanding of the forces at work
in this world must anticipate circumstances of this sort.
One should not shy away from such awesome figures,
either on the ground that they are too large easily to contemplate
or that they are too distant in the future. The danger lies not so
much in the fact as in turning away from it. The year 2000 is within
the life expectancy of most of us in this room. It is part of our
personal futures. We should take little sense of confidence from
the knowledge that much more preparatory work was done to land 200,000
men on the beaches of Normandy in two days of June, 1944, than has been
done so far in anticipation of the landing on this planet by 1999 of some
two billion additional humans.
We should not allow ourselves to be convinced that
immediate problems and crises demand the postponement of consideration
of issues far in the future. World War II leaders were not content
to think only of D-day and its immediate aftermath. As early as
August of 1941, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt projected
their minds well into the post war period, and well beyond the European
Theatre. In the Atlantic Charter, they stated that they hoped to see
established a peace "which will afford assurance that all the men in
all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."
... 27
- 27 -
Thirty-eight years later we have not found the means
of
attaining either of those freedoms on a global scale.
Part of the
problem is a physical one - the sheer size of
numbers, but part of it,
certainly, is lack of will. In an article in the
current issue of
Foreign Affairs, Professor
Michael Howard, of All Souls College, Oxford
University, argues that modern western strategists
have forgotten the
brilliance of Clausewitz' definition of strategy -
his inclusion
for the first time of the social dimension.
Howard was writing of
modern nuclear strategy, but his argument is
equally applicable in a
broader sense. Without taking adequately
into account popular
passions and concerns, no plan or proposal is
likely to be successful.
The passions of the developing countries'
billions are acted out daily in
representative fashion in the assemblies
and councils of the United
Nations agencies, yet we in the west fail often
to give them the weight
they are due. And in so defaulting, we are
misinterpreting both the
current world environment and our chances of
influencing the future.
That future need not be a straight-line
projection of current
trends. It can be better or
it can be worse. The future depends to a
large degree on our assessment of the present
and on our attitudes to
change. Former Prime Minister
Trudeau summed it up some time ago. "The
challenge of future world social and
political events will not be met
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by a stagnant, cautious attitude. We must anticipate, not react;
we
must think, not conform; we must have courage to discard conventional
wisdom in our quest for a secure and peaceful world."
Those of us today who have been given the priceless
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process must
attempt
to construct a statecraft that recognizes and encompasses new
actors
and new forces on the world stage, that acknowledges the momentous
changes of these times, that adjusts to the new economic dependencies.
We must not lose sight of the admonishment of the Yugoslavian
leader Djilas who wrote "We are all living in tomorrow's world
today, still using yesterday's ideas."
VIII
What are our chances? I began this morning by referring to
the 13th Century, its turbulence, confusion and change, and drawing a
parallel with the 20th. Would it be of use to us
today to read the
scorecard of the 14th Century? One historian, de Sismondi,
described
it as "a period of anguish when there was no sense of an
assured future."
Yet it was not, we know, the end of civilization.
Another historian,
Barbara Tuckman, writes: "Violent, destructive,
greedy, fallible as he
may be, man retains his vision of order and resumes his search."
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This week is the beginning
for each of you of a year
of search. I envy you the opportunity,
and wish you well in your
endeavour.
